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 I. Researching the Regulatory State 
 At one point in the not-so-extensive history of nonprofi t research in law, tradi-
tional precedential analysis made up the staple of academic work. 1 But over time, 
the case-based method has ceded signifi cant ground to a diff erent type of research, 
one which has a focus on the nature of regulation, regulatory agencies and  – 
crucially  – the relationship between nonprofi ts and the state. 2 
 In explaining this shift  in research focus, it would also be wrong to say that 
traditional nonprofi t cases, oft en located in trust law, no longer come before the 
courts  – although they no longer stream out of the doors as they once did. It would 
also be wrong to say that they are old-fashioned or removed from the concerns 
of the contemporary sector. Modern cases have facts that strike a chord with 
the contemporary world. To take one example, in  Phillips v Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds , 3 a testator, who was apparently an animal lover, made a specifi c 
bequest of her pet parrot, and then left  a part of her estate to an owl sanctuary. 
Unfortunately, that sanctuary was in the process of winding up at the time of her 
death. Its closure appears to have been linked to a BBC investigation focusing on 
the killing of the birds to avoid veterinary fees. If the gift  had failed, 16 relatives, 
none of whom appear to have been very close to the testator, stood to achieve 
a share. Such a set of circumstances is undoubtedly modern, if a little unusual, 
revealing a great deal about donative motivation and the reasons that cases come 
to court. At the same time, in saving the gift  for charity, the court used timeworn 
charitable principles to modern eff ect. 
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 Th ere are also some heavy storm clouds brewing in trust-relevant fi elds  – and 
these are complex clouds of just the type that precedent-based researchers like. In 
the US, for example, there is now considerable interest in the regulatory challenges 
posed by charitable donor-advised funds. 4 Th e concept behind these arrangements 
is that donors hand over formal control of capital to an investment fund, provid-
ing an effi  cient way to dispose of tax ineffi  cient assets. Yet the very same donors 
continue to informally direct the fund on how their capital should be dispersed. 
Such a system, in which donors feel a moral right to control wealth but have no 
strict legal control over it, seems almost guaranteed, over time, to create litigation. 
Complex nonprofi t issues, of the type that generate case-law, are likely also to arise 
simply from the enormous amount of philanthropic wealth held by a new class of 
 ‘ venture capitalists with a conscience ’. Th is has already been seen in the English 
case,  Lehtimaki v Th e Children ’ s Investment Fund Foundation , 5 which turned on 
whether an independent member of a jointly-founded charity fund, set up by an 
ultra-wealthy divorcing couple, could be compelled to transfer  £ 280 million to the 
wife ’ s new nonprofi t. Th at is certainly a divorce with a diff erence. 
 In consequence, it cannot be said that judicial precedents have become irrel-
evant in nonprofi t research. Th ey still form the basis of some serious modern 
legal-conceptual challenges and pose interesting research questions relating to 
who generates the case law and whose purposes it serves. In this volume, John 
Picton in  Chapter 4 analyses many old wills cases  – which form the basis of the 
rule that established charities last forever  – to assess the motivations behind estab-
lishing charities that last forever. And John Tribe in  Chapter 5 proposes that old 
trust concepts should be adapted to the dramatic and modern context of chari-
table corporate insolvency. Jennifer Sigafoos in  Chapter 6 analyses  Catholic Care 
(Diocese of Leeds) v Th e Charity Commission for England and Wales , 6 a case with 
a distinctly modern policy fault line, to illustrate how courts have struggled to 
adapt to modern statutory law in charity law cases. Adam Parachin in  Chapter 7 
looks deep into the law ’ s precedent-based focus on charitable purposes in order 
to argue that the conceptual legal structure makes it diffi  cult to regulate charitable 
activities. 
 What has changed, and what much research into nonprofi t law now refl ects, 
is that the non-judicial branches of the state have a very great interest in charity. 
Precedent no longer rules the roost, and nonprofi t law is no longer an entirely judi-
cial creation. Th e grandfather of the regulatory agencies is the Charity Commission 
for England and Wales ( ‘ the Commission ’ ). Its role has changed over time. At the 
advent of the Charities Act 1960, which established the register of charities in 
England and Wales, nonprofi ts were still seen as somewhat peripheral, and the 
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modern world of regulation and guidance was still a long way off . Back then, 
nonprofi ts played second fi ddle to a muscular welfare state, which was thought 
to have largely displaced the need for charity. Written in the 1960s, David Owen ’ s 
 English Philanthropy charts a world in which nonprofi ts are relatively independent 
from government, but also not treated as politically important. 7 He presents chari-
ties as  ‘ Junior Partner[s] in the Welfare Firm ’, and as  ‘Auxiliaries of the Welfare 
State ’. At this time, the state did not think to intervene greatly with nonprofi ts, 
preferring instead to let them mop up the residue of social challenges that it did 
not, or could not, deal with directly. 
 Nowadays, no-one would call the nonprofi t sector an  ‘ auxiliary ’. Th e modern 
state cares very deeply about what nonprofi ts do, and crucially, it is prepared to 
intensively monitor them. 8 Nonprofi ts are now wrapped up in the regulatory state, 
the mass of rules and regulations that frame the way government works and deliv-
ers welfare. In turn, it is the nature of that regulatory state which has become a core 
focus for nonprofi t research. In  Chapter 2 , Matthew Harding theorises as benefi -
cial the diverse range of altruistic goods that independent charities might produce, 
but notes that where government seeks to control nonprofi ts through contractual 
funding arrangements, there is a risk that their character might change. Debra 
Morris in  Chapter 11 also charts this change, weighing carefully the development 
of Payment by Results contracting and the risk that nonprofi ts might lose their 
independent voices. Much nonprofi t research has become focused on regulation  – 
a web of diff erent agencies, statutes, soft  rules, hard rules, and downloadable 
guidance. Th is is the brave new world that Oonagh Breen analyses in  Chapter 8 . It 
is also true of the tightly regulated and under-funded housing sector described by 
Warren Barr in  Chapter 13 . Th is is a new research-world, a place of compulsory 
registration for nonprofi ts, and jostling regulatory agencies working together  – or 
attempting to work together  – in complex systems. 
 Th ere is in place a new regulatory-world that still nods to the old will trust 
cases, as they are summarised and digested in regulatory guidance, but it is also 
distinct from it, being far less dependent on precedent and more concerned with 
the effi  cient management of bureaucracy. A new research space has opened up, 
analysing the relationship between nonprofi ts and the state. 
 II. Nonprofi t Controversy within the Regulatory State 
 Even as new academic ground has opened, it cannot be said to be a happy terrain 
that has been revealed. Th e state ’ s relationship with nonprofi ts has proved to be 
controversial. In England and Wales, the charity sector has been beset by dramatic 
scandals. 
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 Th e scandals are not where they might be expected. Few people have problems 
with the regulator itself. Th e Commission is reasonably transparent. Although far 
fewer cases have gone up into the tribunal system than was anticipated when that 
route of appeal against Commission decisions was initially opened up, 9 those cases 
that have been heard place a check on Commission power. Th ere is no widespread 
disquiet against the regulator. As Eddy Hogg notes in  Chapter 10 , most people 
are happy not to know too much about the system, so long as they can be sure 
that there is one in place. It is also only fair to acknowledge that the regulator has 
a great deal on its hands, as Matthew Shillito demonstrates in  Chapter 12 , the 
boundaries of sectoral regulation are fl exible and fast-changing. 
 Instead, controversy relates to the  nature of nonprofi t links with the state, which 
has an ultimate responsibility for the delivery of essential welfare services. In the 
summer of 2015, news reports were dominated by the dramatic collapse of Kids 
Company, a very well-known nonprofi t, whose charismatic founder  – Camilla 
Batmanghelidjh  – had long been a household name in the UK. She had infl uence 
at the very highest level of government, representing her child welfare organisa-
tion which focused on a very poor area of South London. Batmanghelidjh had 
been particularly well connected with the former Prime Minister, David Cameron. 
In her book,  Kids , 10 Batmangheldjh says directly that she was a:  ‘ politically desir-
able product of the Big Society Agenda ’. 11 Or, put another way, her nonprofi t was 
a key element in the former Prime Minister ’ s policy plans to enlarge the role of 
charities in state welfare delivery. 
 Bringing charities directly into essential state welfare provision is a risky busi-
ness. When Kids Company fell apart, unable to balance its books, the press had a 
fi eld day. Allegations, denied by the founder, poured forth in the newspapers about 
extravagant uses of the nonprofi t ’ s funds, such as giving away money directly to 
clients, or using nonprofi t money to buy luxury items, such as trainers, for indi-
vidual children. 
 Th e Kids Company insolvency raised policy questions about the relationship 
of the nonprofi t sector to the state. Th e most obvious questions turned on why 
and how the government had funded an organisation which, upon its insolvency, 
appeared to be chaotically run and lacking in charitable reserves. 12 But with hind-
sight, it is possible to understand why Kids Company seemed so attractive to 
government. It was, before its collapse, a high-profi le child welfare organisation. 
It provided free meals, community support, and education to very poor children. 
It appeared to have many of the positive characteristics that are said, in theory, to 
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be unique to nonprofi ts. Th e organisation, although undoubtedly fl awed, was in 
many ways dynamic and innovative. For example, it used art to help very disad-
vantaged children develop, and there can be no doubt that it was a mission-based 
nonprofi t, seeking energetically to change the world. 
 Th e problem  – the cause of public anger  – was not that such an organisation 
might exist, or even that it could close down, but rather that it should be in large-
scale receipt of public funds, and that those funds were badly spent. Some of the 
most bitter claims were that Kids Company had been well-favoured with money 
at a time when state social services were being rolled back. And so, this was not a 
direct regulatory problem, even if it is true that Kids Company should have had 
a much better fi nancial reserves policy. Th ere was no anger at the system of legal 
rules and guidance which regulate nonprofi ts per se. Th ere was no anger at the 
Charity Commission either. When distilled and refl ected upon, it can be seen that 
public anger fl owed from a perceived problem relating to the relationship that the 
organisation had with the state. Th e bad feeling and surprise at the organisation ’ s 
shock closure stemmed from the fact that a risky organisation like Kids Company, 
working in partnership with government, was being relied upon to deliver the 
most essential type of services  – ie child welfare provision. 
 Nonprofi ts can be highly dynamic. Having a spirit and ethos of their own, 
they might capture the commitment of workers, whether voluntary or otherwise. 
Th ey might innovate in ways that bureaucracies fi nd diffi  cult to do. Patrick Ford 
in  Chapter 9 notes that the continued popularity of the independent school sector 
in Scotland can be attributed in part to failings on the part of the state to deliver 
adequate quality secondary education. But the cost of this innovative and some-
times idiosyncratic character of nonprofi ts is risk. Organisations that are given the 
freedom to do as they think best will oft en make mistakes. Th is means that the 
regulatory state, which is responsible for the delivery of welfare, has a dilemma. It 
can fund high-risk organisations, or it can attempt to tie them down tightly with 
regulation to ensure that money is well spent. Th e Kids Company scandal can be 
understood as an example of the fi rst option  – giving a risky organisation free rein. 
Th ere is no doubt that Kids Company was an unusual organisation, or that its 
founder was a risk-taker. It was that dynamic brand which had attracted the atten-
tion of government in the fi rst place. 
 Th e second side of the dilemma for the state  – the temptation to heavily 
regulate nonprofi ts  – is shown by the even more troubling scandal at St Mungo ’ s 
Community Housing Association. Th at nonprofi t is a very large rough sleeper 
charity. A series of reports in  Th e Guardian newspaper revealed it to be caught up 
as a player in the government ’ s hostile environment policy, 13 which is designed 
to make life as tough as possible for illegal immigrants. Proceeding on the basis, 
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since ruled unlawful, that EU citizens who were also rough sleepers had no right 
to be in the UK, 14 the Home Offi  ce sought, in conjunction with local government 
in London, to collect data as to the whereabouts of homeless people, so that they 
might be removed from the country. St Mungo ’ s, ostensibly a constitutionally 
independent organisation, co-operated with government to pass on the details of 
certain people within its client base. Its outreach workers were seen working with 
Home Offi  ce offi  cials out on the streets. 
 Th at a large and infl uential nonprofi t should get involved in activities that are 
fundamentally against the interests of its clients is unsettling. At the level of theory, 
this ought not to happen. Nonprofi ts are said to have a democratic function in 
representing the needs of their clients to government. Th e reasons that St Mungo ’ s 
became involved in deportation are complex, but directly connected to its relation-
ship with the regulatory state. Th e nonprofi t was in a Payment by Results contract 
agreement with local government in London, such as those discussed by Morris in 
 Chapter 11 . Th at contract  – a social impact bond  – was designed to deliver prof-
its to investors based on the number of people removed from the streets. Within 
this profi t-incentivised frame, the deportation of potentially extremely vulnerable 
clients became a method to achieve St Mungo ’ s contractual goals. 
 Th e problems at St Mungo ’ s were the opposite of those at Kids Company. Th e 
homelessness nonprofi t, through its social impact bond, was kept on an extremely 
tight regulatory leash. Th is had the eff ect that it was unable to serve the best inter-
ests of its client group. It was directly incentivised not to do so. By contrast, at Kids 
Company, the organisation was well funded and largely left  to its own devices  – a 
scenario which eventually led to the collapse of an organisation providing essential 
services to London ’ s poorest, and the apparent waste of funds devoted to welfare 
provision. 
 Yet these two cases pose a challenge to nonprofi t researchers: is there a healthy 
middle ground ? As the state has deliberately become more and more reliant on 
nonprofi ts, it seems very unlikely that the scandals will go away. Either the state 
will seem negligent in funding essentially risky organisations, as in the case of 
Kids Company, or if it attempts to control individual nonprofi ts, it will be seen 
to smother their moral spirit, as in the case of St Mungo ’ s. In answering the ques-
tion, it is necessary for researchers to think very carefully about the role of the 
Commission in regulating a very diverse sector. Specifi cally, when the government 
makes such diverse and unpredictable demands of nonprofi ts, is it possible for the 
regulator to keep good order ? 
 III. Problems of Size 
 Th e question cannot be answered without attention to both the size of the over-
all sector and the greatly varying sizes of diff erent nonprofi ts. Th e charity sector 
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presents challenges for the regulatory state, as it comprises a large part of the 
economy throughout the common law world. It is clear that regulatory oversight 
is needed. Moreover, the size of the registered charitable sector itself is only a 
fraction of the larger nonprofi t sector. Th ere are approximately 200,000 registered 
charities in the UK. 15 Th e size of the nonprofi t sector as a whole is at least twice 
this number, however. In 2012, the National Audit Offi  ce assessed the nonprofi t 
sector and its regulation. It noted that the income of the sector as a whole was 
approximately  £ 113 billion. 16 Registered charities had less than half of this income 
( £ 55.4 billion), and unregistered charities had  £ 57.7 billion. 17 Of these unregis-
tered charities, a large number  – more than 100,000 in 2012  – were very small 
charities, with income of less than  £ 5,000 annually, which are excepted from regis-
tration. Th e distribution between registered charities and unregistered nonprofi t 
organisations is estimated to be similar in Canada, with 86,000 registered chari-
ties and 80 – 100,000 unregistered nonprofi t organisations. 18 An even larger split 
exists between unregistered and registered nonprofi t organisations in Australia  – 
in 2014, approximately one in 10 nonprofi t organisations was registered as a 
charity. 19 
 Most of the income of the non-registered charities in the UK was concen-
trated in exempted charities, which are not required to register with the Charity 
Commission because they are regulated by another entity. Th ese include acad-
emies and other school trusts, higher education institutions, museums and other 
fi ne arts, the Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew, and a majority of nonprofi t hous-
ing associations. 20 Oonagh Breen in  Chapter 8 discussed how a similar issue with 
multiple potential regulators has created problems for the new charity regulator 
in Ireland. Th e lack of regulatory  ‘ space ’ creates issues for emerging regulators, 
but equally exposure to multiple regulators may well dilute compliance for over-
stretched nonprofi t organisations unable to cope with the regulatory burden. 
 Th e large variation in size between organisations in the charitable sector also 
presents regulatory challenges. Th e same concentration in the wealth of the sector 
into a few organisations seen in the unregistered sector in the UK is also seen 
in the registered charity sector: 1.3 per cent of registered charities accounted for 
72 per cent of total income in 2016. 21 Th e work of economists such as Kate Pickett, 
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Richard Wilkinson and Th omas Piketty has raised awareness of the issue of the 
injustices of wealth inequality among individuals, but the inequality in wealth 
distribution in nonprofi ts is equally, if not more, severe and is worsening. Th e larg-
est charities have increased their share of the sector ’ s income over time  – charities 
with annual incomes in excess of  £ 10 million annually controlled 43 per cent of the 
sector ’ s income in 1999 and 57 per cent in 2011. 22 
 What is more, large charities are likely to be very diff erent from small chari-
ties in terms of the makeup of their funding. In the UK, large charities are more 
likely than small charities to be reliant on government for the majority of their 
income. 23 Small charities are more likely to rely on individual donations as their 
main source of funding. In Canada, government-affi  liated nonprofi t organisations, 
such as hospitals and universities, are more likely to rely on government funding 
than community-based nonprofi t organisations. 24 Large charities are thus more 
likely to be exposed to the pressures of state funding on mission drift  and the best 
interests of their benefi ciaries. 
 All of this means that it is diffi  cult to speak of the charitable sector as a whole 
or the nonprofi t sector as a whole and say much of anything at all beyond a very 
general statement about what should be motivating these entities ’ actions: a chari-
table purpose and public benefi t. Th is presents challenges when designing eff ective 
regulation for the sector. Considering the charitable sector in the UK, the sector 
with which we are the most familiar, a chasm exists between the regulatory envi-
ronment appropriate for the overwhelming majority of charities with no paid staff  
and that appropriate for the approximately one per cent of charities that control 
nearly three-quarters of the income of the sector. Perhaps we should be consider-
ing this chasm from the grassroots side of the divide. In previous empirical work, 25 
we have encountered the view from a number of charity lawyers and umbrella 
bodies that large charities are better, more professionally, run. Th e implication is 
that there is less to worry about from larger charities. 
 It must be the case, however, that larger charities present larger risks. Large 
charities will have larger budgets and more benefi ciaries depending on the effi  cient 
administration of those charitable assets for the designated charitable purpose. A 
failure on the part of the charity will leave those benefi ciaries going without. In 
situations where charities are engaged in the provision of government services, 
the failure of a charity to deliver on a contract can mean disruption or delay for 
people who need vital services. Th is can be seen in the message from the Chief 
Executive of the Charity Commission, in its 2018 – 19 annual report:  ‘ Charities are 
increasingly vital to the delivery of services to the public and to communities, and, 
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by extension those services are increasingly dependent on the eff ective regulation 
of charities ’. 26 
 Larger charities also present larger risks to public trust and confi dence. First of 
all, the public is more likely to have heard of large charities and to have an opinion 
of what they ought to do. When people are asked to think of a word associated 
with charity, they are most likely to name large charities, such as Oxfam, Cancer 
Research UK, or the British Heart Foundation, rather than local charities. 27 More 
members of the general public will feel a personal stake in the organisation, as 
more members of the public are likely to have donated or used a service, or to 
know others who have used a service from that organisation. If a mega charity 
errs, it is news. We see the discussion of it in the tabloid press; perhaps politicians 
will try to score political points by raising the story again and again. A risk-based 
regulator, such as the Charity Commission, would do well to focus its regulation 
on large entities. 
 Yet the regulatory system of the Charity Commission is not always capable 
of reaching seeming misfeasance by trustees. In 2019, the Charity Commission 
issued its decision on its investigation into the Garden Bridge charity, which spent 
 £ 50 million of taxpayer money and failed to deliver anything of public benefi t. 
It concluded that there had been no failures of governance or mismanagement 
and that trustees would not face penalties. Th e Commission tried to distance the 
 ‘ failure of charity ’ that took place with the Garden Bridge from the risk to other 
charities delivering public services, noting that the trustees of the Garden Bridge 
had little independence from the government funders who had designed the 
project and contrasting this with  ‘ the usual fl exibility and discretion that allows 
trustees of charities with broader charitable purposes contracting with national or 
local government to continually assess whether doing so is the best way to deliver 
on those purposes for the public benefi t ’. 28 It is debatable, though, to what extent 
trustees of other large charities engaged in government contracts really do have 
fl exibility and discretion in an era of austerity. To surrender government contracts 
would likely mean cuts to staff , as well as a reduction in the services that could be 
off ered to benefi ciaries. One charity that has recently exercised such fl exibility is 
Scope, which has divested itself of its social care services in favour of refocusing on 
what it perceives as its core mission of advocacy for an equal society for disabled 
people. Th is came at a loss of two-thirds of its staff  and 40 per cent of its annual 
income. 29 
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 When considering the future lessons to be learned from the Garden Bridge, 
the Commission concluded that policymakers should  ‘ think very carefully ’ before 
setting up charities created to deliver major public projects. It stated:  ‘ [w]e consider 
it unlikely that the public would expect risks that are inherent in a major public 
infrastructure project to be outsourced to such a charity ’. 30 Th ere are indications 
in the report that the Commission will itself in the future be more careful about 
allowing such an entity to be registered, looking beyond the assessment of chari-
table purposes to determine if it is appropriate to pursue a particular project in 
terms of the risk to the sector. If this is indeed the case, it is welcome. Nevertheless, 
in framing the lessons learned as being for those outside the Commission looking 
to set up charities, the Commission is shift ing responsibility that should rest with 
the regulator. Where, as seems to have been the case with the Garden Bridge, an 
arm of the state is trying to shift  or outsource its risk onto the charity sector, then 
a robust regulator must be able to push back. If  £ 50 million in public funds could 
be wasted without trustee mismanagement, then the boundaries of trustee action 
are set at too broad a level. 
 Perhaps the smaller, grassroots organisations are truer to the original ideas 
of charity. Matthew Harding argues in  Chapter 2 that the charitable sector, as a 
site for voluntarism and altruism in the production of plural goods, merits inde-
pendence from the state and is bound by various types of accountability to the 
state. Th is argument seems stronger when the discussion is framed around smaller 
organisations, with a clearer link to voluntarism and a closer tie to communities. 
Research by the Lloyds Bank Foundation has showed that smaller charities are 
diff erent  – they are more distinctive and have features orientated to local needs. 31 
We have already seen that larger organisations are more likely to receive govern-
ment funding and to be providing government services via contracts. It does not 
seem as suitable to argue for greater independence in those situations, and indeed 
the contracts themselves may bind the charity in ways far more stringent than the 
regulator. Smaller charities, reliant on the good will of their donors and embedded 
in their communities, will have checks on their actions from their constituents. 
 IV. Hope for the Future ? 
 Research by Populus in July 2018, commissioned by the Charity Commission, has 
indicated that in addition to transparency, public trust in charities is grounded 
in authenticity and demonstrating that they live their values. 32 Lower levels of 
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trust had the eff ect of reducing willingness to volunteer money or time to chari-
ties. In response, the Commission made it clear that this was beyond the remit of 
the Commission and was up to charities themselves. Nevertheless, the picture for 
charities and public trust is not as dim as it is frequently made out to be. Public 
trust in the charitable sector has plateaued aft er a fall, but the sector has moved 
up in the public ’ s trust relative to other sectors, perhaps refl ecting a general loss of 
trust in society ’ s institutions. 
 Th is is an important point. In an era when we frequently despair at the news 
awaiting us, we need the charitable sector more than ever to improve social cohe-
sion. Th e potential for the nonprofi t sector and civil society to focus and mobilise 
the public is strong. Indeed, we see from Mark Sidel ’ s  Chapter 3 that concerns over 
the threat posed by overseas civil society have led to increased state control of their 
activities in China. Th e mobilising spirit of nonprofi ts as a threat to authoritarian 
state control is an extreme case, but the potential role of the sector is a powerful 
one in all societies. 
 Although we have discussed the potential for big charities to propose bigger 
risks, we also need the sector to be entrepreneurial and to tackle big challenges 
that are beyond the reach of a state. An obvious case is global climate change, a 
worldwide threat that is both beyond the reach of an individual state ’ s control and 
seemingly beyond the reach of current political will. For situations such as this, it 
is appropriate for the regulator to give nonprofi ts a long leash. Th e risk is merited 
and with big risk may well come a big reward. 
 On the other hand, it is not appropriate for the state to try to shift  risks that it 
should appropriately be carrying itself. We see this when unachievable contracts 
are tendered out to nonprofi ts to deliver core social services, placing nonprofi ts 
under state control and compromising their independence, while still shielding 
the state entity in the (sometimes inevitable) event that services cannot be deliv-
ered. Another example is a project such as the Garden Bridge, where the state 
shift ed risk, but not the fl exibility or the independence to mitigate that risk or 
to make other decisions. In these instances, the regulator should act robustly to 
protect the sector from the potential reputational damage. 
 We need a global regulatory framework that is suitable for enabling charities to 
tackle big challenges  – that allows charities to be innovative; to be risky when the 
potential rewards merit it. But it should not allow charities to be exploited. 
 Research in nonprofi t law and policy is an exciting area that has opened up 
beyond the precedents. Th e contributions to this volume illustrate that the modern 
scholarship in the fi eld engages with law, policy, philosophy and other disciplines. 
As nonprofi ts occupy such a prominent place in society in much of the world, 
research into the fault-lines for charity law allows the researcher to engage with 
society ’ s big questions. It has been our privilege to curate one such collection of 
outstanding eff orts to understand what is at stake in today ’ s debates in charity law. 

